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[L. A. No. 19845. In Bank. Nov. 21, 1947.] 
HELEN SANDERS LAMARR, Respondent, v. JACK O. 
LAMARR, Appellant. 
[1] Divorce -l'indiDIJ. - Under Civ. Code, 1131, it is a trial 
court's duty, when making 1lndings of fact in a divorce case 
as in other cases, to find ultimate rather than probative or evi-
dentiary facta. 
(2] 'J.'rial-l'indinp-InCODSistency Between Findings of Ultimate 
and Probative l'aets. - Findings of ultimate facts are con-
trolliDg unleaa drawn as conclusions from 1lndings of probative 
facts that do not support them. 
[2] See 24 Oal..Tur. 968, 972; 63 A.m.J'1U'. 795. 
Melt. Die. Beferences: [1] Divorce, §l05; [2] Trial, 1331; 
[3-5] Divorce, 1112; [6] Husband and Wife, ISO; [7] Busbud 
ud ..... '167(3). . 
~) 
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[3] Divorce - Findings - Oruelty. - A general finding that one 
spouse by cruel treatment has inflicted grievous mental suf-
fering on the other is a finding of an ultimate fact, and not 
a mere conclusion of law. (Overruling Smith ". Smith, 62 Cal. 
466.) 
['] Id.-Findiags-Oruelty.-In view of the fact that Code Civ. 
Proc., 426b, provides that in the absence of a demurrer for 
nncertainty a cause of action for divorce is properly stated 
by pleading cruelty in general terms, a defendant who does not 
interpose a demurrer for uncertainty has no right to findings 
that are more specific than the allegations in the complainL 
[6] ld. - Findings-Oruelty. - A finding that a party to a divorce 
action has not been guilty of extreme cruelty answers the 
issue raised by the pleadings when cruelty is pleaded in gen-
eral terms. It is no more uncertain than other findings of 
ultimate facts. (Disapproving Bilger v. Bilger, 75 Cal.App.2d 
638, 17 P.2d 34, and of auy contrary language in Del Buth 
v. Del Buth, 75 Cal.App.2d 638, 171 P.2d 34, and Lucieh v. 
Luckh,75 Cal.App.2d 800, 172 P.2d 73.) 
[8] Husband and Wife - Propq - Admissibility of Evidence.-
Evidence is admissible to show that a husband and wife who 
took property as joint tenants actually intended it to be com-
munity property. 
[7] Id. - Property Settlement A.greem8llta-BeQ.uisites--De1iV8Z7. 
-A property settlement agreement signed by the husband in 
duplicate, delivered to the wife's attorney and signed by her, 
was incomplete prior to redelivery of one of the duplicates 
to the husband, and became a nullity where his counsel trans-
mitted a notice of revocation to her prior to such delivery. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Geo. A. Dockweiler, Judge. Affirmed. 
Action for divorce. Judgment for plaintiff aftirmed. 
John W. Preston and David L. Sefman for Appellant. 
Don Lake for Respondent. 
/ Ben Van Tress as Amicus Curiae, on behalf of Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Plaintiff brought this action for divorce 
against her husband on the grounds of adultery and extreme 
cruelty. The cause of action on the ground of extreme cruelty 
was stated in general terms as follows: "WillfulJ.y disregard-
ing the solemnity of his marriage vows, defendant has treated 
i I.. ra] ... c:w..Jw. lo-Ya. hpJ. &CIS. 
/ 
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plaintiff in a cruel manner and has subjectcd her to a course 
of cruel treatment and has thereby wrong.fully inflicted upon 
plaintiff grievous mental suffering, humiliation and embar-
rassment. That because of such cruel treatment, plaintiff 
has suffered extreme mental cruclty to such an extent as to 
impair her health and peace of mind." Deferulant denied ~ 
plaintiff's allegations as to both causes of action. He filed 
a cross-complaint praying for a divorce on the ground of 
extreme cruelty of plaintiff, which he alleged in general terms. 
He also alleged specific acts of cruelty. The trial court 
granted plaintiff a divorce on the ground of defendant's ex-
treme cruelty. It made no specific findings, but found that 
the allegations of cruelty in the complaint were true despite 
defendant's objection "that the proposed findings of facts 
do not cover specific facts as to the issue of extreme cruelty" 
and his request for specific findings. The trial court also 
found that the allegations in defendants' amended cross-
complaint were untrue. The judgment awarded all community 
property to plaintiff except the sum of $2,500 awarded de-
fendant. The property awarded plaintiff included a ranch, 
which the trial court found to be community property. De-
fendant appeals. 
Defendant contends that the general finding as to his alleged 
cruelty was insufficient to support the judgment in the ab-
sence of a waiver of specific findings, that there was no such 
waiver since he objected to the proposed general findings, and 
that therefore the trial court committed prejudicial error in 
failing to make specific findings as to defendant's cruelty. 
[1] A trial court's duty to make findings of facts in a di-
vorce case is predicated upon Civil Code, section 131, which 
provides: "In actions for divorce the trial court must file 
its decision and conclusions of law as in other cases ..•. " 
That duty, which is the same in divorce cases as in other cases 
(Waldecker v. Waldecker, 178 Cal. 566, 567 [174 P. 36]; see 
Ungemac.h v. Ungemach, 61 CaLApp.2d 29, 39-40 [142 P.2d 
99]) is to find ultimate rather than probative or evidentiary 
facts. [a] Findings of ultimate facts are controlling unless 
drawn as conclusions from findings of probative facts that do 
not support them. (Fitzpatrick v. Underwood, 17 CaL2d 722, 
727 [112 P.2d 3]; Quinn v. Rosenfeld, 15 Ca1.2d 486, 492 [102 
P.2d 317]; Hammond Lumber 00. v. Barth Inv. Oorp., 202 
CaL 606, 609 [262 P. 31]; see 24 Cal.Jur. 968.) [3] De-
fendant, relying on Smith v. Smith, 62 CaL 466, 468, contends, 
.1Ioweve.r, that a leueralfindina that ODe 1IpWIi8l1,f.,~  I 
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ment inflicted grievous mental suffering upon the other is a 
conclusion of law and not a finding of an ultimate fact. In 
the Smith case a finding was held to be "but a conclusion of 
law" that stated: "That the repeated acts of cruelty, as 
established by the evidence, upon the part of said defendant 
toward her said husband and children during the last sev-
eral years, have in:flicted upon the plaintiff grievous mental 
suffering." This holding is contrary to the rule established 
by later cases that the question whether one spouse has in-
flicted grievous bodily injury or grievous mental suffering 
upon the other is a question of fact to be determined by the 
trial court as the ultimate fact in issue in a divorce action 
for cruelty. "Whether in any given case there has been in-
flicted this 'grievous mental suffering' is a pure question of 
fact, to be deduced from all the circumstances of each par-
ticular case, keeping always in view the intelligence, appar-
ent refinement, and delicacy of sentiment of the complaining 
party; and no arbitrary rule as to what particular probative 
facts shall exist in order to justify a finding of the ultimate 
facts of its existence can be given." (Barn" v. Barn", 95 
Cal. 171, 177 [30 P. 298, 16 L.R.A. 660]; Keener v. Kuner, 
18 Ca1.2d 445, 447 [116 P.2d 1]; Fleming v. Fleming, 95 
Cal. 430 [30 P. 566, 29 Am.St.Rep. 124]; Mac Donald v. 
Mac Donald, 155 Cal. 665 [102 P. 927, 25 L.R.A.N.S. 451; 
Atlery v. Avery, 148 Cai. 239 [82 P. 967] ; Cline v. CUne, 4 Cal. 
App.2d 626 [41 P.2d 588]; Shaw v. Shaw, 122 Cal.App. 172 
[9 P.2d 876]; Davis v. Davis, 58 Cal.App. 100, 102 [207 P • 
. 923]; Van Camp v. Van Camp, 53 Cal.App. 17, 22 [199 P • 
. 885]; Scheibe v. Scheibe, 57 Ca1.App.2d 336, 340, 341 [134 
P.2d 835]; Ungemach v. Ungemack, 61 CaI.App.2d 29, 33-34 
i [142 P.2d 99] ; Del Ruth v. Del Ruth, 75 Cal.App.2d 638, 644 : 
'[171 P.2d 34].) Smith v. Smith, supra, must therefore be I 
:ftgarded as overruled by the later cases. 
~F [4] Defendant contends, however, that a general finding 
':of the infliction of grievous bodily injury or grievous mental 
:sU:frering by one spouse upon the other is too uncertain to 
'sUpport a divorce decree and that therefore speciftc findings. 
of acts constituting the cruelty are necessary, when the losing 
party has not waived speciftc findings by his failure to object 
'to proposed general findings. Defendant relies on Frankl"ft 
; •. Franklin, 140 Cal. 607, 609 [74 P. 155]; Turner v. Turner, 
187 Cal. 632, 635 [203 P. 109]; Perkins v. Perkins, 29 Cal. 
App.68 [154 P. 483]; Nelson v. Nelson, 18 Cal.App. 602 [123 
p~ 1099]; CGrgna714 V. CtJrgMni, 16 Cal.App. 96 [116 P. 806}; 
I 
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Bilger v. Bilger, 54 Cal.App.2d 739 [129 P.2d 752] ; Del Ruth 
v. Del Ruth, 75 Cal.App.2d 638 [171 P.2d 34]; Lucich v. Lu-
cich, 75 Cal.App.2d 890 [172 P.2d 73]. For the determina-
tion of the present case it is immaterial what rule governed 
findings as to cruelty before 1939 when the Legislature 
adopted section 426b of the Code of Civil Procedure (Stats. 
1939, p. 1673), which provides: "In an action for a divorce, it 
is not necessary, in the absence of a demurrer for uncertainty, 
to plead specific facts constituting cruelty in order to plead 
a cause of action." Findings are made by a trial court to 
dispose of the issues raised in the pleadings. "If facts are 
stated in the findings in the same way in which they are stated 
in the pleadings, they are sufficient . .. 'The only purpose 
of the findings is to answer the questions put by the plead-
ings.'" (Dam v. Zink, 112 Cal. 91, 93 [44 P. 331]; McCar-
thy v. Brown, 113 Cal. 15, 18 [45 P. 14]; Carter v. Canty, 
181 Cal. 749, 752 [186 P. 346]; Dodd v. Dunn, 193 Cal. 334, 
335 [223 P. 952J; see 24 Cal.Jur. 927, 985.) "A general find-
ing that all of the allegations of a complaint are true has been 
repeatedly upheld by this court. (Gale v. Bradbury, 116 Cal. 
39 [47 P. 778]; Johnson v. Klein, 70 Cal. 186 [11 P. 606].)" 
(McKelvey v. Wagy, 157 Cal. 406, 409 [108 P. 268]; see 
Stevens v. Stevens, 215 Cal. 702, 705 [12 P.2d 432] ; Popescue 
v. Popes cue, 46 Cal.App.2d 44. 53 [115 P.2d 208].) The 
Legislature was presumably aware of this relation between 
pleadings and findings when it amended the Code of Civil 
Procedure to provide that in the absence of a demurrer for 
uncertainty a cause of action for extreme cruelty is properly 
stated by pleading cruelty in general terms. Since defendant 
did not interpose a demurrer for uncertainty, he clearly had 
no right to findings that were more specific than the allega-
tions in the complaint. 
[5] Defendant relies, however, on Bilger v. Bilger, 54 
Cal.App.2d 739 [129 P.2d 752]; Del Ruth v. DeZ Ruth, 75 
Cal.App.2d 638 [171 P.2d 34]; and Lucich v. Lucich, 75 
Cal.App.2d 890 [172 P.2d 73], which were decided after the 
1939 amendment to the Code of Civil Procedure. In the 
Bilger case the court was "oncerned with a finding "that it 
is not true that the defendant . • . was, is or has been guilty 
of extreme cruelty to the plaintiff." It was held that this 
finding was too uncertain to support the judgment. A find-
ing that a party has not been guilty of extreme cruelty is 
as much a finding of an ultimate fact as one that a party 
baa been euilty of extreme cruelty, and, WheZl enelty baa 
.. ) 
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been pleaded in general terms, it answers the issue raised in 
the pleadings. It is no more uncertain than other findings 
of ultimate facts. The Bilger case is therefore disapproved. 
In Del Ruth v. Del Ruth, 75 Cal.App.2d 638, 644 [171 
P.2d 34], it was held that the general findings of the trial 
court were sufficient to support the judgment in the absence 
of any objection to them. The statement in that opinion 
that the findings would have been insufficient, had they en-
countered objection, W&.CiI unnecessary to the decision. 
In Lucich v. Lucich, 75 Cal.App.2d 890 {172 P.2d 73J, 
the complaint set forth several specific allegations of cruelty 
as well as a general allegation. The trial court found that 
all the allegations in the complaint as to cruelty were true. 
The trial court also found, however, that "said acts of wrong-
doing herein are such in the judgment of the Court as not 
to constitute or amount to extreme cruelty." It was held by 
the District Court of Appeal that the findings as to the alle-
gations of the complaint established the ultimate fact that 
defendant wrongfully in1licted grievous bodily injury or 
grievous mental suffering upon plaintifr, and that the finding 
that defendant's conduct did not constitute extreme cruelty 
was not a finding of fact but a conclusion of law governed 
by an erroneous conception of extreme cruelty. The state- I 
ment in the opinion that standing alone a finding of cruelty 
in general terms would not have been sufficient was unnec-
essary to the decision. Any language in Del Ruth v. Del 
Buth, 75 Cal.App.2d 638 [171 P.2d 341, or Lucich v. Lucich, 
75 Cal.App.2d 890 [172 P.2d 73J, contrary to the holding 
... in the present case is disapproved. 
[6] Defendant contends that the trial court erred in 
finding that the ranch was community property. He relies 
on the fact that it was conveyed to the parties by a deed des-
, ignating them as joint tenants. It is settled. however, that 
f evidence is admissible to show that a husband and wife who 
r took property as joint tenants aetua1ly intended it to be 
community property. (Tomaier v. Tomaier, 23 Cal.2d 754, 
/i. 757 [146 P.2d 905J, and eases there cited.) There was evi-
l' ~ dence that when the parties acquired the ranch, they agreed 
~. it should be community property. [7] Defendant contends, 
t however, that even if it be assumed that the ranch was com-
•. ' munity property, it. ceased to be such and became property r owned by the parties as tenants in common by virtue of a 
£. property settlement agreement dated August 17, 1945, which t .. p1'OViclecl &mODi other thinp: "(4) TW both partiea 0WIl 
f 
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as community property a certain ranch located in Lancaster, 
California. That it is hereby agreed between the parties 
hereto that said ranch, its improvements and equipment 
shall be sold at any price agreed upon by the parties, and 
that the net proceeds derived from the sale of said ranch 
shall be divided equally, share and share alike, between the 
parties hereto. In the interim said property shall be held as 
tenants in common, each holding an undivided one-half in-
terest in the same." This agreement was prepared by de-
fendant's counsel and was signed by defendant in duplicate. 
The two copies signed by defendant were delivered to Mr. 
Paul Cote, who at that time was plaintiff's attorney. Plain-
tiff signed both copies of the agreement and kept one, giving 
the other to her attorney, who never delivered that copy to 
defendant or his counsel. Defendant's counsel advised plain-
tiff, by a letter dated November 8, 1945, "that Mr. IJa Mar 
hereby gives you notice of revocation of the proposed agree-
ment, above referred to, by reason of the fact that said agree-
ment was never accepted to this date, and for other reasons 
not herein specifically designated." In accord with this letter 
defendant's counsel declared at the trial of this case that the 
property settlement agreement was not completed, on the 
ground that both copies thereof signed by defendant remained 
in the hands of plaintiff or her attorney, and that there was 
no delivery of either to defendant or his coun.~el and there-
fore no acceptance of the proposed agreement by plaintiff. 
This position formerly taken by defendant himself i.~ correct. 
A contract in writing and a grant of property take effect 
upon delivery of the instrument. (Civ. Code, §§ 1626, 1054; 
Miller v. Jansen, 21 Cal.2d 473,476 {132 P.2d 8011; McKin-
ney v. Sargent, 216 Cal. 18, 22 [13 P.2d 373J; Hudemann v. 
Dodson, 215 Cal. 3, 6 [7 P.2d 997] ; lvey v. Kern County Land 
Co., 115 Cal. 196, 201 [46 P. 926J; Houk v. Wt'lliams Bros., 
Ltd., 58 Ca1.App.2d 573, 579 [137 P.2d 737J.) Since plaintiff 
failed to deliver to defendant or his counsel a copy of the in-
strument signed by her, it did not take effect as a contract or 
a grant of property. Delivery of the instrument signed by 
defendant to plaintiff's counsel constituted an offer to enter 
into a property settlement agreement with plaintiff, which 
defendant was free to withdraw and which was withdrawn by 
the letter of revocation addressed b7 his counsel to plaintiff. 
The judgment is aftlrmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Schauer, J., azul 
Spence, J., eonaaned. 
